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Shifting of Japan’s National Security Norm and the Issue of North Korean 
Abduction of Japanese, 2002-2004 
 
I. Introduction 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a dramatic visit to North 
Korea and met Kim Jong-Il on September 17, 2002.  Koizumi and Kim had pragmatic 
reasons to meet.  Koizumi wanted to take an initiative to ease the tension in East Asia 
caused by the resumed North Korean nuclear program and appeal internationally and 
domestically the leading role Japan can play in the regional diplomacy.  Kim agreed to 
the meeting expecting that opening diplomatic relationship with Japan would serve as 
the symbol of his willingness to solve matters diplomatically and force the United States 
to reconsider her hard-line policy toward the communist regime, with Koizumi serving 
as the “bridge” for the talks between the United States and North Korea.  Through the 
meeting, both sides agreed to cooperate to ease the regional tension and not to take any 
measure bringing further negative implication to the current security situation.  As the 
result, so-called “Pyongyang Agreement” was signed.  Japan “apologized” formally for 
the harsh colonial rule she had imposed on Korean peninsula in the past and the pain 
she had inflicted on North Korean citizens, and declared her intension to start an 
economic aid package once the diplomatic relationship was resumed.  North Korea, for 
its part, declared that it would take appropriate measures to assure no more “spy ships” 
from entering Japanese water and open itself to regional-security related conversations, 
especially with Japan.  However, the most significant event of this high-level talk was 
Kim apologizing for the act of some factions within the communist regime in the past, 
namely kidnapping Japanese citizens during the 1970s.  Kim openly admitted the fact 
to Koizumi and announced that among thirteen people kidnapped, eight had already 
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died and five were still living in North Korea.   
 Although the issue of Kidnapped Japanese was not mentioned in Pyongyang 
Agreement, Japanese and North Korean officials agreed that the five survivors be 
returned to Japan immediately.  The timetable for the return was set, with the victims 
“temporarily” visiting Japan first and returning to North Korea afterwards to persuade 
their children, who were born and raised in North Korea with no knowledge of their 
parents’ origin, to settle in Japan.  Then the victims and their children would make the 
final one-way trip back home. 
 At first, the Japanese mass media and most “political commentators (seiji 
hyoronka)” in the social elite group welcomed Pyongyang Agreement as a victory of 
Japanese diplomacy.  Koizumi was hailed for taking an ambitious measure to make 
Japan the leader in shaping a new regional security framework and finally resolving the 
abduction issue.  Some mass media even commented positively on the “frankness” and 
“courage” of the North Korean leader in openly admitting and apologizing for the 
nation’s wrongdoing in the past, when other complicated issues have blocked a talk 
between the two nations for decades.   
 But right from the days following Koizumi’s visit, the Japanese society, 
although gradually, started to express a different reaction toward the abduction issue and 
the way Koizumi handled it.  Although the significance of the Agreement in the 
international politics was of small relevance to ordinary Japanese, the kidnapping issue, 
understandably, had caused a genuine “shock” in an unprecedented scale; it was the first 
time for Post-World War II Japan to experience a foreign leader in Asia openly 
admitting and apologizing for the crime done against Japanese.  Japanese society, in 
general, has long considered itself the oppressor in the pre-World War II regional history 
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and this understanding has had tremendous impact on forming the basis of post-war 
Japanese foreign policy.  However, the society being exposed to the news of abduction 
issue provided, for the first time, an opportunity for Japan to reconsider such 
interpretation, since the fellow citizens had become the victims of a deliberate act by a 
nearby country.  Moreover, the Japanese society was also shocked that their nation had 
done nothing to help these victims in the past.  Scholars, politicians, and journalists 
started to point out that Japanese mentality of assuming only the peaceful posture to its 
neighbors after World War II had prevented any measure to investigate the case.  Many 
in the society agreed with the argument and started to realize that the culture and the 
norm governing the national security policies in post-war Japan had been incapable of 
protecting its citizens.  As the shock gradually turned toward the criticism of North 
Korea and to the national security culture of post-war Japan, some portions of the mass 
media, aided by certain social elite groups who had held a similar discontent toward the 
post-war norm in the past, but who previously had not enjoyed such massive social 
support for the lack of any hard case evidence to justify their claim, started to jumped 
onto this issue.  They further stirred the emotions of the people by broadcasting what 
kind of evil society North Korea is in general and how naive the Japanese society has 
been in protecting the security of the nation and its citizens.  As more social members 
clearly supported such stance, other mass media which previously held positive 
commentary about Pyongyang Agreement, or the ones that remained neutral at least, 
increasingly became the target of criticism and they were obliged to bandwagon with 
the general trend of the society hit by the North Korean abduction shock.  Prime-time 
coverage about every aspect of North Korea in negative tones and the abduction issue 
filled the media everyday, and the public would not accept any stance that did not 
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openly express sympathy and anger on behalf of the social atmosphere.  The 
movement was now taking the momentum. 
 The positive reaction shown during the first few days after the Koizumi visit 
quickly faded away.  And the society, reinforced by the support from certain social 
elites and the media discontent toward the post-war Japanese norm which, in their belief, 
invited the abduction issue, cried for strong measures toward North Korea by setting a 
new normal standard on conducting national security policies.  When the five 
abductees came back to Japan, the government, in accordance with Pyongyang 
Agreement, announced at first that they came back to Japan “temporarily” to visit the 
family and would come back again with the children in North Korea.  But at this point, 
the public, now “enlightened” by the shock and the media, strongly opposed the idea of 
returning them.  The government was eventually pressured to change the tone in its 
briefings and announcements.  For its fear of criticism, the government had to conceal 
the detailed contents of the agreement related to the abduction issue and vaguely 
changed the official statements, claiming it never agreed on a “temporary visit.”  
Despite North Korean protest that Koizumi was breaking the agreed framework for 
resolving this specific issue, Japanese government, to parry the domestic criticism and 
suspicion that Koizumi wanted to win an international prestige at the expense of settling 
the issue with a mere handshake, was pressed to take stronger measures against North 
Korea.  North Korean officials who came to Japan with the five victims to coordinate 
the timetable were forced to leave the country, and all the ships from North Korea, 
which have been the only way of trading between the two nations for decades and the 
only mean of ethnic Koreans to visit their families in North Korea, were temporarily 
banned from entering Japanese harbors.  And Koreans in Japan increasingly became 
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the target of violence and bashing.  The five victims in Japan were separated from their 
children in North Korea, and the two governments blamed each other vehemently for 
breaking the Pyongyang Agreement.  After almost two years of gridlock, Koizumi 
visited Pyongyang for the second time to break the ice in May, 2004.  Although the 
children of the former abductees and Robert Jenkins, American husband of one of the 
victims Hitomi Soga, were finally “returned” to Japan, the general trend of the Japanese 
society in viewing North Korea has changed little since. 
The significance of the reaction shown by the Japanese society toward the 
kidnapping issue is the fact that the shock brought by the incident has not ended with 
the criticism on North Korea.  The issue has demonstrated in visual fashion that the 
Post-World War II norms of national security have been proven obsolete.  After the 
war, Japanese society was disillusioned by the pre-war doctrine of guaranteeing its own 
national security and economic autonomy through military expansion.  The society had 
suffered the consequences of the pre-war norm and Japan admitted the fact that the 
people of Asia also paid dearly for her belief.  As the lesson, post-war Japanese society 
strongly embraced the ideal of peaceful nation with emphasis on economic prosperity 
based on mutually beneficial trade and non-aggressive diplomacy in the international 
community.  The society strongly supported the doctrine that Japan would never take 
forceful measures in dealing with foreign countries and it wanted this idea to be 
institutionalized in the statecraft of the nation.  The result was the so-called Peace 
Constitution that contains the famous Article 9 prohibiting Japan from maintaining 
armed forces or waging war as the right of a sovereign state.  And the society in 
general upheld the belief that because Japan had been the historical oppressor, Japan 
must prove to the neighbors that it had evolved into the role model of a peaceful nation. 
 6
 The kidnapped Japanese issue, however, showed to the public for the first 
time in the post-war period that it can also be a victim and Japan cannot cope adequately 
with the norms shaped with a guilty mind during the 1940s and 50s.  Now more 
Japanese openly claim that embracing the national security norm of post-war Japan will 
make the society the victim of its own belief.  Increasing number of social members 
now support the need to approach security issues from a new viewpoint, with the 
academic and moral justification provided by the social elites and mass media backing 
up this trend.  Social reinterpretation of Japan’s post-war politics and national security 
policies is under way.  As the by-product of the abduction shock, other national 
security related issues are also on the table for discussion and debate with a strong 
public support, such as Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, laws making the central 
government’s control over the citizens and public facilities easier during “national 
emergency,” bill enabling the government to impose an economic sanction without a 
UN Resolution, dispatching Self Defense Force abroad to areas of military conflict with 
less limitations on its role, and prohibiting vessels from certain countries from entering 
Japanese harbor with Diet consent.  More significant is the fact that many intellectuals 
claim the need for Japanese to discard their “sense of historic guilt” they had been 
“forced” to embrace ever since the defeat in World War II.  Hard-line intellectuals, 
consisting of scholars, “political commentators,” government officials, and journalists, 
through publications and mass media coverage, make their point that Japan is the 
“victim” of the regional history.  According to them, Japan has become impotent by 
the Constitution, formulated in the first place by American ideology and which was 
forced upon them by the “MacArthur’s gunpoint” after the war.  And since Japanese 
had held the false belief that it had been the evil, Japanese people had embraced the 
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“illegitimate” foreign-origin Constitution and remained defensive and apologetic to its 
neighbors for the past half a century.  These claims, which had been considered too 
extreme in the past, are flowing freely in national commentaries and mass media, and 
are clearly enjoying significantly more followers since 2002 especially among younger 
generations.  It is clear that the public’s shock and frustration built up by the abduction 
issue is now targeted at North Korea and equally toward its own post-war identity and 
norms.  And the government, as we can see from the case of handling the abduction 
victims, is influenced by the domestic consequences brought on by this issue.   
The purpose of this paper is to understand why and how the Kidnapped 
Japanese Issue is reshaping Japan’s national security culture in recent years.  In the 
post World War II Japan, there have been numerous internal and external factors with 
possible implications on the national security.  However, the norm of national security 
has remained generally constant and the government has strictly respected the national 
political culture of upholding peace and remained reluctant to use forceful measures in 
diplomacy. 
Therefore, it is interesting why North Korean factor has given this constancy to 
transform in a fundamental way.  The study of the direct connection between political ?
norm embraced by a society and national security policy has been researched by the 
constructivists and historical institutionalists of political science in recent years.  This 
paper follows the same stream of analysis.  Although the broad range of constructivist 
and historical institutionalist arguments does not allow any simple categorization or 
abstraction, all the scholars of the two approaches share a certain basic assumption 
about the mechanism behind foreign policy decision-making.  They assume that 
foreign policy conducted by a government reflects, and is guided by, certain belief 
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system held by majority of social members.  This belief system is variously termed 
political norm or culture.  Norm and culture are the product of that society’s history 
and the interpretation of the history by its members over the years.  The constructivists 
and historical institutionalists further agree that although the norm and culture is 
reluctant to change, it is not a given character of a nation.  Norm transforms when the 
society’s interpretation of its history and values alters. 
 However, the conventional constructivism and historical institutionalism focus 
on the time when a norm is already “reigning” in a society.  They tend to explain how 
an existing political norm came to be embraced by a society in the first place and how it 
has influenced foreign policies.  Although they agree that norm is a temporary moral 
standard held by a society, they do not explain how and when it is going to transform.  
Therefore, I believe it is vital for constructivists to draw attention to the “gap,” which is 
a transitional period when a certain social norm transforms into another.  The question 
of when, how, by whom, and under what condition an existing norm is discarded and a 
new standard is set, has been generally overlooked by the scholars and this paper 
attempts to analyze the nature of that gap.  
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 This paper was written with the basic constructivist assumptions while 
simultaneously shifting its main attention to explain how a norm would transform from 
one to another through the transitional period.  It utilizes the case study of current 
Japan after the Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang and claims that the shock of the abduction 
issue has possibly provided the society to invite the transitional period in which 
post-war norms can be re-evaluated.   
 This paper argues that because of the “shock” caused by the abduction issue, 
Japanese society, for the first time, started to embrace a new sense of 
“self-victimization” by the act of a neighboring country to which Japanese have felt 
historic “guilt.”  Traditional way of interpreting Japan’s past and the norms that were 
formed as the product of such interpretation are now at the brink of a major change, 
since the society as a whole came to an understanding that the norm they have embraced 
over the years has been totally incapable of dealing with this shock.  Part of the social 
elites and mass media that also had doubts about the prevailing social norms raised their 
(A) 
Current norm prevailing 
in a society 
(B) 
The transitional period when the 
current norm is challenged.  The 
gap between the two consecutive 
norms 
(C) 
The 
new 
norm 
The limitation of the contemporary constructivist and historical institutionalist approach is that it focuses 
on (A) while taking (C) as an inevitable.  The nature of (B) should be further researched. 
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voice to support and justify the social frustration, and their link had spiral effects on 
further advocating the need for a change in the norms governing national security.  
And as these social elites and mass media gained more support and became the 
representatives of the social feeling, other mass media bandwagoned with the trend.  
Now, the government is not able to ignore this social frustration backed up by the mass 
media and social elites skillfully utilizing the shock.  And if the society and the 
government both reach the point where they unanimously agree on the necessity to 
change the current norms of national security, the social and political institutions that 
have preserved the norm will also be targeted for a change.  Thus the prospect of 
drastic change in the way Japan perceives itself in relationships with others is likely to 
transform in the near future. 
THE MAIN ARGUMENT 
 
 
 
The Japanese society is informed of the abduction issue 
For the first time, the post-war Japan is shocked to confront an incident where Japanese has become the victim by
an act of a neighboring nation.   The sense of self-victimization spreads by the “shock” 
Society feels victimized by both North Korea and the norm that has been incapable of preventing the incident.  
The social elites who had held the discontent toward the norm utilizes the chance to make their voices heard by 
providing their interpretation of the incident and the criticism of the norm through certain mass media.  The 
society, shocked and frustrated by the abduction issue, increasingly supports their claim.  Other security related 
issues previously justified by the norm all become the object of reconsideration. 
Social elites reinforce the frustration of the society to facilitate the abandonment of the norm and keep its 
momentum.  When the majority of social members clearly support the social elites’ stance, other mass media 
acutely aware of the social preference bandwagon with the trend and the government is also forced to implement 
policies to reflect the change in the social preference.  
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In the first part of Chapter 2, the definition of norm/culture from constructivist 
viewpoint will be elaborated, followed by the theoretical analysis of the rule of norm in 
stable periods and the process of norm transformation when the society sees the need 
for a change.  In the second part, the detailed process of the norm transformation will 
be further argued with the emphasis on current Japan’s example, with the role of social 
elites and mass media in mobilizing the social opinion to criticize the prevailing norm.  
Chapter II constitutes the theoretical backbone of the paper.   
In Chapter 3, empirical evidences for the main idea will be provided, mostly 
from the leading papers of Japan to see how their tones on certain national security 
issues have changed between pre-2002 and after September 2002.  These will provide 
clear and live evidences justifying the hypothesis that the North Korean element has 
indeed been considered by Japanese society as the “shock” that would have serious 
implications for Japan’s transformation in national security field in the near future. 
 
 
II. Theory 
 
1) The Nature of National Security Norm?  
 
What kind of factor influences a nation’s security policy decision-making has 
been the question that has riddled political scientists over the years.  The traditional 
study of national security policy has been mainly conducted around the governmental 
decisions made by the policy-makers.  The methods by which the study was conducted 
also emphasized the research of governmental documents and diplomatic relations of 
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one nation with the others.  As a result, most of the national security policy studies 
have focused on the international system and the “external pressure” influencing the 
governmental decision on national security.  Social factors, such as the way domestic 
society sees the issue of national security from a certain cultural viewpoint or how it 
controls the governmental decision, have been generally neglected.   
In this paper, the focus of the analysis is the transformation of the fundamental 
belief-system beneath the notion of national security within a society and its eventual 
impact on the formation of actual security policies.  Although a security policy is 
ultimately organized by government, the governmental decision is in turn the reflection, 
or even in the least case, in accordance with the “norm” or “cultural” standard the 
domestic society holds about how the nation should conduct security policies.  Without 
taking into consideration or reflecting such norm, the governmental decision running 
contrary to the cultural standard of the society cannot expect to win legitimacy in a 
democratic nation.  Therefore, the decision involving the national security in 
democratic nations, including that of Japan, is influenced by the social norms.  From a 
micro-perspective, there could be small deviations from the prevailing social norms 
when conducting everyday security-related policies; but they are short-term 
phenomenon and the government has to adjust its policy direction eventually to make it 
in accordance with the norms in the long-run.   
Then what exactly is the definition of norm (or culture) in the national security 
studies and through what process does it permeate into the society and influence the 
perception of its member and the government in the security policy-making?  In this 
paper, the term norm and culture are used as interchangeable definitions.   
Including the term used in the national security studies, common to all theories 
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of culture is the notion that human behavior is guided by socially shared and transmitted 
ideas and beliefs.  Culture as such comprise beliefs about the way world is - including 
at the most basic level beliefs that define the individual’s and the group’s identities - and 
ideas about the way world ought to be.  Political culture refers to those beliefs and 
values that shape a given society’s orientations toward politics.1  In the national 
security studies, the term norm is defined as the fundamental value and identity by 
which the majority of the social members approach the national security issue to secure 
and enrich a society’s existence.   
Katzenstein claims there are three categories of norms that are important for 
political analysis.  These are regulatory, constitutive, and institutionalized norms.2  
Regulatory norms define standards of appropriate behavior that shape interests and help 
coordinate the behavior of political actors.  Constitutive norms express actor identities 
that also define interests and thus shape behavior.  Regulatory and constitutive norms 
are closely linked and they have direct effects by defining collectively shared standards 
of appropriate behavior that validate social identities.3  In other words, regulatory 
norm provides the standard of appropriate behavior for the society in viewing a certain 
issue when the norm governs the society; constitutive norm provide the perspective 
from which the society should view itself and thus help it to form a collective identity 
among actors.  However, norms of the society, either regulatory or constitutive, are not 
sufficient to explain their impact on national security policy-making at the 
governmental level.  This is where the institutionalized norm becomes important to 
                                                  
1 Thomas U. Berger, ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,’ in Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996) p. 325. 
2 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms & National Security – Police and Military in Postwar Japan 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996) p. 18. 
3 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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understand the process of the social norm influencing policy-making.  Social norms 
have to be placed in a certain political “frame” so that they can be easily referred to 
when the government, being constantly watched by the society to make sure it acts 
appropriately within the framework of the established norm, conducts a security policy.  
Social norms placed in the political frame help the society and the policy makers to 
make sure that the policy conducted is indeed based on the collectively shared identity 
of the society and the norm constructed by it.  For this purpose, the norms are 
“institutionalized” in the state system.  When these norms are adopted into the political 
mechanism of the nation and become institutionalized in the social structure to become 
a moral foundation by which people refer to in making moral political decisions, these 
norms are said to be “institutionalized norms”.  Institutionalized norms are the normal 
foundation of the nation’s institution which creates things that are taken for granted and 
thus limit the range of choice.4  Institutionalized norm enforce the cultural trait agreed 
upon by the society in a legitimate way to the members in the political decision-making.   
In any society, social members form a norm in the first place by collectively 
interpreting the nation’s history in a certain way, and give birth to the norm that takes 
into consideration such interpretation of its own roots.  Once formed, the norm 
becomes the principal value of the nation that provides the justification to the way we 
live and think.  For example, the political and social values of the early United States 
emphasizing democracy and check-and-balance of the governmental branches were 
formed by the society’s negative interpretation of European history, and the 
empowerment of the states and the rights of citizens to bear arms were also the product 
of the nation’s memories during the colonial period.   
                                                  
4 Ibid., p.30. 
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Norms being embedded in the moral foundation and identity of social actors 
does not mean they are perpetual aspect of a nation.  Contrary to popular criticism that 
the study of national security culture takes social norm as a taken-for-granted trait of a 
nation, norm is not an unchangeable, given characteristic.  Although norms are indeed 
considered taken-for-granted during its reign in domestic politics, they are not static and 
they are bound to change over time, when the society feels the existing norms cannot 
cope with the needs of the society anymore and starts to question the 
taken-for-grantedness of their governance.   
Then this inevitably brings us to an important question: if norms are not indeed 
static and if they are the object of constant change, then how do they transform in time?   
Norms held by society are constantly contested by actual events.  While 
surprises brought on by the events can be usually reinterpreted so that they do not 
contradict existing norms and beliefs, they also create pressures that can lead to a 
re-evaluation and modification of the culture.  In extreme cases, if a culture totally fails 
to meet the expectations of its members, large-scale defections to other cultural systems 
are likely to result.5  Berger argues that although emotionally laden beliefs and values 
that make up the core of a culture are resistant to change, occasionally rapid change in 
core beliefs and values occurs.  But the alternation of core beliefs takes place only after 
they have been thoroughly discredited and the society is under great strain.  
Individuals and groups are then forced to re-examine their old beliefs and seek new 
ways of making sense of the world and new solutions to the problems confronting them.  
Such rapid and fundamental change tends to be accompanied by psychological distress 
and is broadly similar to Thomas Kuhn’s description of paradigm shifts in the natural 
                                                  
5 Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory? (Boulder: Westview, 1990) 
chapter 5. 
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sciences.6 
History of any nation is usually covered by long periods when social norms 
prevail in the society.  However, there are brief historical moments between them, 
which I term the transitional periods, when an existing norm is considered no more 
valid, usually by an abrupt incident that demonstrates to the social members the 
incapability of the norm in representing and protecting the collective social identity.  A 
new norm is then constructed through an internal social mechanism and eventually the 
brief turmoil of the transitional period ends, giving birth to a new era with a new social 
identity.  Since norm is an expression of collective identity held by the majority of 
social members and since identity is based on, and justified by, a certain interpretation 
of the historical experience the society has gone through, the inner mechanism of 
society during the transitional period tries to establish a new identity around the new 
interpretation and re-evaluation of the social history.  During this transitional period, 
various factions of social members engage in debates to win support from the majority 
to achieve a new social identity on which the new social norm they support has to stand.  
And the fundamental belief-system and social identity by which the existing norm 
prevailed in the past becomes the main target of social criticism.  When a new social 
identity is again firmly established through the debates during the transitional period, it 
also constructs the new norm by which the society would measure the appropriateness 
of its actions in conducting politics, including the national security.   
For a social norm to be recognized by the members to be obsolete in 
representing the will and identity of the society and to bring the transitional period for 
the search of the new identity, two factors have to work hand in hand.  A society is 
                                                  
6 Berger, op. cit., p.326. 
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constantly faced with actual events that both come from the outside and from within the 
society.  These events provide the materials by which the social members can reflect 
on their norm’s meaning and validity in the changing environment.  Some of the events 
could cause stress and discontent among some of the members in the society that the 
existing norm is not fully capable of helping them to deal with the situation.  But 
usually these events are interpreted by the majority in such a way that they are adopted 
into the society without altering the basic ideas of the social norm.  The stress is kept 
under control by the society understanding the importance of maintaining the lessons of 
their history, which provided the foundation of the social norm.  And the norms 
already institutionalized in the society make it difficult to use the stress as a sole 
justification for arguing against them. 
However, when this stress continues to be brought into the society over the 
period, society is forced to continuously oppress its existence by interpreting it to fit the 
underlying identity of the social value.  Through the process, more social members 
come to recognize the existence of the social stress and the recognition inevitably raises 
the number of sympathizers within the society and facilitates the spread of the 
discontentment toward the norm.  This increasing stress among more members within 
the society is the first step to challenge the norm.  At this stage, however, it is still not 
sufficient to invite another transitional period.  For most part of the social members, 
the memory of the historical social debates during the previous transition period, which 
brought the establishment of collective interpretation of social history and gave birth to 
the current social identity and the norm, is still considered to be more important to 
maintain order and conduct national security policies, as Katzenstein argues. 7  
                                                  
7 Katzenstein, op. cit., p. 3. Refer to it for further study about history and institutions giving norms 
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Majority still do not see the value in risking another social transition, although the 
expanding stress is recognized and accepted as a fact.   
But when another factor, the second, finally hits the society, it provides the 
necessary “spark” which can ultimately lead the society to another transitional period.  
The second factor is a genuine “shock.”  Some political literature consider stress and 
shock as interchangeable definitions in explaining the process of changing norms, but 
stress can exist in a society for a relatively long period and be kept under the 
mainstream without being clearly visible.  And it is not necessarily shared by all the 
members within the society.  Shock, however, is a one-time phenomenon that hits the 
heart of the society and the norms governing the minds of the members openly.  Shock 
is an abrupt psychological distress that discredits the core beliefs of the society in a 
short time-span.  It brings an instant psychological pressure on all social members and 
makes further protection of the existing norm seem old-fashioned.  The shock can take 
various forms, but it has to make clear to the social members that the norm cannot cope 
adequately with the changing needs of the society, and protecting and acting within it 
makes the society a “victim” of the consequences caused by the antiquated norm.  
Shock is the event that illustrates to the society in a visual fashion that its members are 
facing a grave danger of losing the order and the integrity of the society, because they 
have taken for granted the norm that cannot deal with a serious threat and thus have 
placed themselves voluntarily as the victims of the norm.   
This “sense of self-victimization” element of the shock, accompanied by the 
incrementally accumulated social stress in the previous years, enforces the society to 
feel the necessity for a fundamental change in the existing social identity and norm.  
                                                                                                                                                  
importance and endurance. 
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For this reason, depending on the existence or non-existence of the “shock,” stress can 
bring different consequences to the society.  Social stress during normal times, as 
mentioned, is usually oppressed or absorbed to maintain the higher authority of the 
social norm, but when the shock that makes the basic ideas behind the norm to be 
questionable and obsolete, the same stress is reinterpreted to justify the need for a 
change.  The combination of social stress and “shock” trigger is thus crucial in 
bringing the social norm to change. 
In the next part, the theory of norm transformation will be applied to current 
Japan after the Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang.  More detailed analysis of the theoretical 
mechanism behind norm transformation will be conducted to see exactly how, and by 
whom, a norm is forced to face the transitory period.  The roles and the interactions 
among the social mass (public), mass media, the social elites, and the government will 
be analyzed.  With this theoretical base, we will see how the norm that has prevailed 
for more than fifty years in Japan is now under pressure to change with the emergence 
of the North Korean shock in 2002.   
 
2) Shifting of National Security Norm: Japan since 2002 as the Theoretical Case 
Study  
 
 In this part, we will first see how the Japanese society formed the post-WWII 
political norm and the nature of that norm.  In the later part, we will ask the crucial 
question that is of the major interest to this paper: Even if a society is hit by the 
“shock,” how does it exactly bring the transitional period and lead the norm to be 
dismantled?  Just recognizing the shock by the social members does not automatically 
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lead the society to a re-evaluation of norms.  Social members do not just “gather 
around” when the shock hits.  There must be a “leading element” that makes all the 
people to recognize the shock as a significant threat, and raises voice on behalf of the 
social frustration.  Recognizing the shock as a shock in the first place does not occur 
automatically by all members of the society.  Since there are many factions and players 
in the society, the “leading element” would play a crucial role in making people realize 
the shock and stir their fears and frustration, and “mobilize” them to cry for 
re-evaluation in a single voice, thus bringing transitional period.  This question is 
going to be answered by disclosing what that “leading element” is, and showing how it 
utilizes other players in the social system to mobilize the social stress and lead it to the 
change of the social norm. 
The norm of national security in postwar Japan was formed as the product of 
the tragic defeat in World War II.  Thoroughly disillusioned by the previous social 
norm of realizing militarily-strong and economically-autonomous Japan, and leading 
and uniting Asia with an ideology originated in Japan to confront the expansion of the 
West into the region, the war made Japan to realize the limits of its own power and the 
illusionary theme of making a unified Asia under the Japanese ideology.   
Stress had incrementally accumulated by the bombings of the homeland and 
the news being brought in by various informal sources of catastrophe in the various 
theaters of the war, even before the formal national capitulation, had already caused 
doubts in the minds of many about the validity of the pre-war norm.  Accompanied by 
this, the defeat as the “shock” element caused the society to realize that they had been 
victimized and the society was pulverized by the belief they had held for long.  The 
stress shared by some members during the war, although not necessarily by all members 
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before the defeat, now provided additional justification for such belief of 
self-victimization. 
The end of the war, therefore, swiftly brought a transitional period and the 
social debate ensued in which the new social norm was to be framed with a new 
collective interpretation of social history.  In the debate, the focal point was the issue 
of approaching the history so that re-evaluating it would reflect the victimized social 
emotion caused by the previous norm.  Majority demanded for a new norm which 
would give the justification for the society’s disillusion and the necessity for 
abandoning the pre-war institution.  Therefore, the inner debate reflected the reaction 
to the experience the ultra-nationalism brought about the society.8  By interpreting 
history in a new fashion by domestic actors, the society, through the debate, gradually 
developed the beliefs and values that make the society reluctant to resort to military 
force.9   
As we have seen, by the (re)interpretations of history we, as social members, 
choose and the lessons we learn tell us who we are, what we want to become, how we 
should behave, they become the core of the norms and the norms help shape future 
political choices.  In Japan, through inner conflicts around the issue of forming a new 
identity in the aftermath of the war, idea of defining nonviolence as a standard for 
agents of the state prevailed.10   As these new identity and social norm of reluctance to 
use military and concentrate on economy while accepting modest position in the arena 
of international politics with the national emphasis on non-violence and peace, these 
beliefs and values in turn became institutionalized in the Japanese political system in 
                                                  
8 Katzenstein, op. cit., p.30. 
9 Berger, op. cit., p.318. 
10 Katzenstein, op. cit., p.7. 
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various ways, both formal and informal, and became integral part of Japan’s post 1945 
national identity.11  The clearest example is the so-called Peace Constitution, which 
includes Article 9 that bands Japan in conducting war, even for a self-defense, as a right 
of a sovereign nation.  Further, Japan’s postwar norm institutionalized national 
consensus on economic growth and the subordination of the search for political equality 
with other states, especially the United States.12 
In short, the trauma prevailing in the Japanese society in the 1940s and 1950s 
gave weight to the notion of peace and “never-again” determination to avoid 
international confrontation, and the norms of the society thus formulated based on such 
collective identity was the key in pressuring the government to institutionalize the 
political system in the same fashion.  Successive governments afterwards were thus 
bound to follow this norm and put the social identity of “peace and economy first” into 
the decision-making process of the national security.  For more than half a century, the 
social norm of Japan has never faced a threat of fundamental alternation since, despite 
all the events that had emerged in the international society with possible consequence in 
Japanese foreign policy.  
Then why is the Abduction issue fundamentally different from these other 
events?  What differentiates this particular issue from other equally turbulent historical 
incidents with potentiality on changing the Japanese social norm?  What is the 
uniqueness about this issue that made substantial number of people to newly support the 
changes to the way national security should be handled?  Why do significant numbers 
of people now openly support the stance once considered extreme and seen as taboo in 
the past, and had forced the discontents of the post-war norm countless times to fail to 
                                                  
11 Berger, op.cit. 
12 Katzenstein, op.cit.,, p.30. 
 23
grab the minds of the people and remain as minority of minorities? 
If we want to approach this question theoretically and see how the North 
Korean issue might have sparked the start of the transitional period indeed, we need to 
observe the social elites and their relationship with the mass media and the society.  
The central idea of my argument is that in a democratic society, there is a class of 
“social elites” who are placed in the upper class of the social mass.  They consist of 
scholars, religious leaders, town leaders, journalists, politicians not taking part in direct 
decision-making of the government, lawyers, doctors, artists, and media commentators 
who make general reviews on virtually any issue.  They are not necessarily expert in 
national security matters or politics in general, but they are relatively more educated 
than ordinary social mass and they possess the ability to approach mass media to make 
their voices heard.  They are capable of showing their ideas through numerous means, 
such as publication in books, magazines, newspapers, TV appearance, lectures, town 
meetings, street oration, etc.  But their main way of transferring their ideas is through 
mass media such as TV, newspaper, and magazines related to politics.  Mass media, 
which is also a part of social elite, cannot solely rely on their own ability to evaluate 
socio-political issues since journalists are mostly generalists and they require assistance 
by other social elite groups to make their news coverage valid and professional.  It is 
especially the case of contemporary Japan, since most of the journalists go straight to 
the “frontline” right after graduating as undergraduates and there is no professional 
preparatory period in which they are trained to analyze and evaluate complicated social 
problems they are required to write about.  Therefore, they are constantly assisted by 
other social elite groups and there emerges a link between mass media and the social 
elite. 
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Under normal conditions, when the society processes a stable norm, mass 
media, with the assistance from various sources with various political stances, makes 
diverse voices on political matters within the accepted area of the social norm, 
depending on the position of the writer and the source.  As long as the article does not 
deviate fundamentally from the accepted basic norm of the society, the diversity of mass 
media is guaranteed and society is exposed to these ideas.  Although there are always a 
few radical minority elements within the social elite class and their ideas find their way 
into mass media coverage time to time, their ideas in most cases are never represented 
in their purest form or enjoy significant support from the general public, since the norm 
is prevalent in the society and is firmly embedded in the majority conviction.  This 
diversity in mass media content within the accepted realm of the social norm stands on 
the basic assumption that mass media takes responsibility to reflect the basic normal 
principle of the society in which they exist.   
Mass media, either as a social group or as a single corporation, show diversity 
in their views within the accepted sphere of the social norm for another reason.  By 
doing so, the mass media of Japan finds a way to parry criticism, accusations that it is 
politically biased.  Therefore, the modern mass media of Japan presents their message 
as a college or as a “mosaic” in which myriad items are juxtaposed with no logical 
relation to one another.13  The juxtaposition of items in the mosaic presents the reader 
with multiple, mutually incompatible images.  Far more striking examples could be 
found, in which newspapers and television in a single edition or day of programming 
offer up dazzling inconsistencies and conflicting images when items are juxtaposed.  
                                                  
13 Susan J. Pharr, ‘Media as Trickster in Japan: A Comparative Perspective,’ in Susan J. Pharr and Ellis S. 
Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), p. 30.  For 
further study on the definition “mosaic,” refer to Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964 or MIT Press Reprinted Edition, 1994) 
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Not only is the individual newspaper a mosaic, but also the whole stream of media 
presents itself to the public as a large mosaic, a jumble of confusing, conflicting bits and 
segments of information and commentary.14  In contemporary Japan, it has been the 
idea of concentrating on economics and the idea of democracy, and being careful on the 
ideas that could reflect directly the militant ideas of the ultra-right or ultra-left that could 
jeopardize either the Peace Constitution or the US-Japan Security Treaty.  By never 
deviating from such norms and never expressing only one stream of the social opinion, 
meaning they transfer their ideas in the “mosaic,” the media can achieve both the 
justification of their existence in respecting the underlying social value and also the 
shutting-out of the criticism that might arise by just showing only one extreme side of 
the social norm.  Although some branches of the mass media, such as party papers, 
exhibit strong attachment to a particular school of social thought, major mass media of a 
national scale has strongly followed this strategy.  This has been generally the trend of 
Japanese society and the role of mass media all the way to the 1990s.   
This system of mass media-social elite changes if there emerges the shock 
mentioned earlier.  Then the mass media and the social elites become the main source 
for the society to turn to understand the meaning and the character of that shock.  
Although the mass media and the social elites make various voices under normal 
circumstances and the society is open to the diversity of the media as long as it does not 
violate the basic normative agreement of the society, such mechanism start to 
deteriorate in this “shocked situation.”  The media and the social elites that can best 
understand the nature of the shocked emotions held by the majority and that can best 
explain the meaning and consequence of that shock in a simple and satisfying way start 
                                                  
14 Ibid., p. 32. 
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to win support.  People find refugee in the mass media that best represents the 
frustration held by the members caused by the shock.  Because such shock is strong 
enough to make society to question the existing norms, the voice that is the simplest, 
most critical, and most radical gains popularity in the process.  In their critical and 
radical evaluation of the shock and the persuasion on the disability of the existing social 
norm to cope with such shock, the mass media and the social elites in the critical group 
propose their alternative plans to cope with the situation, and those proposals become 
more radical in the process because the elites use the incrementally-bred other social 
stress to justify their views.   
At this stage where more and more social mass agrees with the critical faction 
of the mass media and the social elite, other mass media and social groups which at first 
presented different versions of interpreting the shock, although that does not necessarily 
mean they dismissed it as the “shock” or cried for the protection of the current norm, are 
either pressured to be quiet about the subject or bandwagon with the trend.  Since the 
pressure to follow the “flow” of the society strengthens and since both society and the 
mass media know that the opinion directly in contrast to the ongoing movement in the 
society would be bitterly criticized, mass media in general is pushed to follow the trend.   
Mass media as a whole social group becomes the stage where more and more 
of such critical ideas are transferred publicly.  Then both mass media and the society 
reach the point where the critical idea, which at first was sparked by the shock, becomes 
a given-fact that majority of the mass now feels something definite needs to be done.   
When the shock was first recognized by the society, that factor was first used 
by a small faction within the mass media and the social elites to stir within the society 
the sense of victimization caused by the existing norm and to re-evaluate and criticize 
 27
the norm.  But since the stress caused by the shock gives enough energy and reason for 
the society to support such voice, more mass media and social elite start to recognize 
this overwhelming trend and starts bandwagoning rather than maintaining their own 
voices on the matter.  Then the society in turn realizes again, thanks to the mass media 
and the social elite coverage, that the shock is indeed a great danger and that the social 
norms have to be corrected. 
But why would the mass media, rather than keeping the diverse character, 
bandwagon with the social trend when the shock sparks the society?  As mentioned 
earlier, mass media of Japan justifies its existence in the society by reflecting the 
psychological trend and the values of the society and by conducting the strategy to keep 
out the criticism that it is biased in any way.  And even when it shows diverse voices, it 
makes sure it remains in the borderline of the underlying social norms.  Therefore, 
when the social frustration accumulates and when it is clear to everyone that the society 
wants to use the shock as a reason for a major change, the mass media, with its 
responsibility to reflect the minds of the majority, follows it to keep the mass from 
criticizing.  Another reason can be found from the Japanese mass media’s lack of any 
long-term concrete political stance.  Unlike the mass media of the West where the tone 
in broadcasting strongly reflects the corporation’s affiliation with a particular party, 
stock holders or supporting political group, Japanese mass media draws various ideas 
from various social elites and never intentionally reveal or conduct propaganda for its 
political stance on a particular issue.  However, this stance, if we approach from an 
opposite direction, means that mass media can support any stance when the society, the 
master which mass media is inclined to follow, shows a clear sign of preference.  
When it is clear that the society wants an alternative direction to lead the society, the 
 28
radical idea which was originally cried out only by a faction within the mass media and 
supported by a fraction of the social elites who correctly predicted the prospects of how 
the already-shocked society would react if it were further stirred by such idea, starts to 
permeate into all the mass media and they want to be the leading element in leading the 
society to that direction.  They want to be the starting runner for leading the society 
into the transitional period and recognized as the leader.  Therefore, the characteristic 
of the Japanese mass media can be stated as follows:  It considers reflecting the social 
values to be the most important mission.  Rather than clinging to its political stance, 
which it does not possess, it tries to parry criticism and embrace all the schools of ideas 
within the norm that the society supports.  But when the society is hit by a shock and 
when an element within the mass media and the social elite uses it to stir the emotions 
of the social members, and when it has been shown that they have been correct in 
reading the minds of the frustrated mass, the media in general, in turn, uses the same 
doctrine of “reflecting the social minds” by bandwagoning with the revealed social 
preference.  And when they bandwagon, all the mass media want to be the leading 
voice.  They can do all these because they do not have any concrete political stance.   
Pharr, by applying the term “trickster” which is a metaphor for a whole range 
of stranger-outsiders in literatures of symbolic anthropology, argues that the most 
important characteristic of Japanese media is its unfixed social position.15?  As the 
trickster, Japanese mass media evaluates and force the community to reexamine what 
has been accepted and reified by criticizing, analyzing, parodies, and satires.16  The 
media as trickster may be seen as persistently shaking and subtly undermining 
authorities’ basis for legitimacy and even as contributing to public cynicism.  The 
                                                  
15 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
16 Ibid., p. 27. 
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reflexivity stirred in society as a result of the media’s work leads the public into steady 
reexamination of those claims which, thanks to the media, can never be fully taken for 
granted.  Furthermore, media as trickster offer the public new perceptions of reality.17  
And the trickster horrifies.  It brings the community face to face with chaos, by this 
means the community is forced to confront the consequences of existing arrangements.  
Furthermore, the trickster induces reflection on the nature of the established order on the 
part of the community.  Finally, the trickster bonds.  By forcing members of the 
community to reflect, it brings them together.18  Mass Media, when they have decided 
on which direction they want to go in reflecting the social trend and how they would 
further strengthen their own position within the society during the ongoing social 
movement, can elaborately use these techniques to stir the mind of people to make them 
believe something has to be done.  And they want be recognized by the society that the 
mass media has done its job in leading them. 
This bandwagoing of all the branches of mass media would become a one-way 
movement that can not be turned at this point.  This would be the rightful peak of the 
transitional period.  Since an outcome of a social debate would strongly reflect the 
atmosphere or the trend at the time of the debate, the transitional period would later end 
in the direction that would reflect the people’s desire during the transition, as the 
anti-militaristic ideas of the society in the 1945 actually made the transitional period to 
end by reflecting such thought at the end.  If a society, hit by a shock, rolls into a 
transitional period with the mass media all bandwagoning with the society in a short 
time period with a concentrated energy, this transitional period could even be seen as a 
“political hysteria” from outside.   
                                                  
17 Ibid., p. 33. 
18 Ibid., p. 27. 
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In the final stage, the social preference that has been shown clearly during the 
transitional period on how the society should evolve finally materializes into a new 
norm and puts enough pressure to the government to change its existing policies and put 
the new ideas of the society, represented by the mass media, to the political institution.  
When the new institutionalized norm prevails in the society and it permeates into the 
society to a large extent, then the society becomes “normal” again under the new social 
norm and mass media and social elites are free to make diverse voices again under the 
basic moral foundation of the new social norm. 
In her recent thesis, Morris-Suzuki analyses the current “political hysteria,” 
which can be considered as a violent way of a society getting into the transitional period 
in the theory of this paper, that has occurred in the Japanese society with the emergence 
of North Korean abduction issue and its domestic political implications by applying the 
theory by late Murray Levin in a very similar fashion to the theory presented in this 
chapter.19  The forces which bring hysteria, if we follow the logic of his paper, 
resemble the process of how the shock brings the transitional period and forces the mass 
media to follow the mainstream ideas behind the social upheaval generated by the shock, 
as shown in this paper.  Therefore, her analysis of the origin and the mechanism 
causing the political hysteria and the method of unifying the social opinion into a single 
voice, by oppressing the minority ideas by applying various direct and indirect pressures, 
are strikingly compatible with the theory mentioned here. 
 Morris-Suzuki applies late Murray Levin’s claim and says the political hysteria, 
                                                  
19 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Politics of Hysteria: America’s Iraq, Japan’s North Korea, 
http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/politicsofhysteria01.html 
Japanese version can be found at:  Tessa Morris Suzuki, “Histeri-No-Seijigaku: America-No-Iraq, 
Nihon-No-Kitachosen,” translated by Motohashi Tetsuya, Monthly Sekai (Iwanami Shoten, February 
Edition, 2003), pp. 230-240. 
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the term which is interchangeable with the shocked and angered social mind during the 
transitional period, takes place in democratic society with the consent of the majority 
and mass media taking the lead in it.  Levin utilizes the term “pluralistic repression” to 
define the move by the mass media and society to oppress minor ideas and force the 
society to adopt a single way of interpreting an issue at hand.  This phenomenon, 
Levin was careful to emphasize, is not the same as the repression (of diverse ideas 
within the society) exercised by totalitarian and autocratic states, where opponents of 
the regime can simply be made to “disappear” and press criticism can be banned.  The 
characteristic of “pluralistic repression” is that it occurs without drastic changes to 
democratic institutions, and with the consent of the majority.  It nevertheless leads to 
severe violations of the rights of those minorities (either in the social mass or the mass 
media) defined as “dangerous” or “subversive.”  In the world of the media, “pluralistic 
repression” created a single enormously powerful dominant narrative about the key 
events of the day.  Yet the press remains free.  Critics are still allowed publicly to 
question the dominant narrative:  it is just that anyone who does so is liable to be 
marginalized, ridiculed, decried as “unpatriotic” and labeled an “extremist” or part of 
the “lunatic fringe.”20 
 In his 1971 study, Levin sought to explore the forces which produced such 
waves of national hysteria.  One key point, he emphasized, was the fact that they are 
never just the product of fantasy.  Their persuasive power comes from the fact that they 
are always built around a core of truth about a real act of violence or a real source of 
danger (which is interchangeable with the “shock” definition).  These kernels of truth 
he called “usable facts”:  “A most usable fact is a bit of reality, like bombing, that 
                                                  
20 Ibid. 
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outrages and creates a demand for a quick, simple, and anxiety reducing explanation.”21  
His explanation is compatible with the shock hitting the society and the society 
justifying the need for a change by using the shock and other social frustrations.    
 Levin suggests that the political hysteria is not simply a product of the media 
alone.  Rather, public, interest groups, media and politicians become drawn into a 
complex reciprocal relationship as the level of hysteria rises and the narrative spirals 
ever further outward from the initial “usable facts”.  Typically, the story is first taken 
up by activists or interest groups (the social elites) who see themselves as representing 
both particular moral causes and a broader national interest.  Once it becomes clear 
that the issue strikes a receptive chord with the public (which means the society is at 
“shock”), a widening range of groups become involved, and begin to add their voices to 
the chorus of public statements.  The media realize that the story helps their sales, and 
intensified media reporting interacts with the public statements of activists.  Interest 
groups and media form relationships with each other:  “each agency builds on the 
definition of the situation created by other agencies and thereby participates in the 
transformation by which the definition of the situation becomes fact”.  And at the end, 
as public emotion rises, the government responds with ever more strident statements on 
the issue.22 
The theory presented in this chapter can be applied to many democratic nations 
in general, but this is especially highly applicable to the case of Japan.  One reason for 
it is that mass media is regarded very highly, almost taken-for granted, by the readers 
and the viewers.   
                                                  
21 Ibid.  The part in parenthesis is from Murray Levin, Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic 
Capacity for Repression (Basic Books, 1971), pp.115-116. 
22 Ibid.  The part in parenthesis is from Levin, Ibid., p.179. 
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Japan is a mass media saturated society and society depend heavily upon media 
for information and evaluation of social matters.  The penetration and influence of the 
print media are great in Japan, as five newspapers (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei, 
and Nihon Keizai) are national newspapers, each with a circulation of more than 2 
million.  In addition there are the local and regional newspapers, some of which have 
circulations exceeding those of many leading US newspapers; daily mass-circulation 
party newspapers, magazines that range from book-length “comprehensive magazines 
(sogo zasshi) to the ubiquitous comic books read by young and old alike on the trains.  
NHK (Nihon Hoso Kyokai), Japan’s public broadcasting organization, is the second 
largest broadcasting corporation in the world (after BBC).23  The media have a vast 
following and they enjoy great prestige.  While Gallup and Harris surveys in the US 
have found that less than 20% of Americans polled express high confidence in 
television and the newspapers, both media enjoy far greater credibility in Japan.  
Today news papers in Japan have higher credibility ratings than television news, but a 
solid majority of Japanese trust both.24  More than the simply the matter of number, 
society gives tremendous trust to mass media as the source of information and the 
interpretation of it.  Japanese study found that only some 20% of those surveyed saw 
any kind of partisan bias in the newspapers, television, or magazines.25   
Since the society depends heavily upon the media and the media represents the 
ideological trend of the social mass during the time of change (the time of “shock”) to a 
great degree, government and decision makers also depend heavily on the mass media 
                                                  
23 Pharr, ‘Media and Politics in Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,’ in Pharr and Krauss, 
op.cit., pp.4-5. 
24 Nihon Shimbun Kyoukai, The Japanese Press 1992 (Tokyo: Nihon Shimbun Kyokai, 1992), pp. 32, 
36-37.  Quoted from Pharr, Ibid., p. 5. 
25 Scott Flanagan, Ichiro Miyake, Shinsaku Kohei, Bradley Richardson, and Joji Watanuki, The Japanese 
Voter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p.304.  
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to grasp the social preference.  Many Japanese party politicians and policy makers 
attach enormous importance to the “public opinion.”  As the media express and, more 
frequently, interpret public opinion, these institutional transmission belts for social 
norms are of extraordinary importance for Japanese politics.26  The reason behind it is 
because as in all democratic systems, norms of legitimation based on the “will of the 
people” have become accepted in Japan.  However, Japan has had a parliamentary 
form of government (that is, no direct election of chief executive) with an electoral 
system of multimember representative constituencies at the national level (in other 
words, not a proportional representation system) that made it difficult to determine what 
the “mandate” of general election was.  As the result, the media by default came to be 
perceived as performing the function of representing the general “public” more than in 
other democracies.27  Therefore, while the public depend heavily on the mass media to 
get the information on what the “current status” of the norm within the society is, the 
government, in turn, relies on the media to predict and understand how the public will 
perceive a certain political issue. 
 
 
III. The Evidence: Comparison of Publications, Opinion Survey, Mass Media 
Reporting & Commentaries of Earlier Periods and since 2002 
 
1) Traditional National Security Norm of Japan 
 
                                                  
26 Katzenstein, op. cit., p.39. 
27 Ellis S. Krauss, ‘The Mass Media and Japanese Politics: Effects and Consequences,’ in Pharr and 
Krauss, op. cit., p.359. 
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In the aftermath of the World War II, Japanese people were thoroughly 
disillusioned by the pre-war identity and they went through debates to construct the new 
identity which would form the basis of the norm of the new nation.  Learning the 
lesson from the past, Japan clearly defined the long-run strategy as the separation of its 
economic and military security.  Many Japanese believed that Japan was driven into 
the war because she aimed to protect and maintain the flow of economic resources from 
abroad by military means, and it in turn forced the nation to search for more overseas 
markets and resources to maintain her military might.  Japanese during the war was 
governed by the norm that Japan was engaged in the war as the last resort to protect her 
own “realm of autarky” and “the lifeline” of other fellow Asians from the hands of the 
Western Imperialism.  From 1945, therefore, the society was fully aware that the 
linkage between the economic security and that of military had to be separated in order 
to avoid Japan from making the same mistake of going to war for unrealistic economic 
aim.  Rather than using the economic survival as the justification for the military 
aspect of national security, the post-war Japanese believed that the economic 
development by itself would enhance her status in the world and thus strengthen the 
national security without relying on force.  As the symbol of this new identity, the 
Peace Constitution was declared and the new norm of peaceful and commercial Japan 
without the mean and the intention to flex its muscles overseas was gradually admitted 
among the social members.  Although the society and the government grudgingly 
admitted the necessity of forming an alliance with the United States to protect herself in 
the Cold War, Japanese were strongly opposed to being driven into any direct military 
confrontation with foreign countries.  The society would trade a small portion of its 
new ideals with the reality in order to win its security in a peaceful manner; Japan 
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would provide some military bases on the islands to the United States, her 
protector-to-be, and in turn be guaranteed the access to the American market.  And the 
close ties with the United States would function as the “ticket” Japan required to join 
the international society again by being the friend of the superpower in the Western 
World.   
The post-war government quickly adopted this social desire.  In the 1940s and 
early 1950s, the Japanese government resisted American pressure to take part in the 
regional defence of East Asia.  Instead, successive Japanese governments have drawn a 
sharp line between economics and military security.  Economic growth and 
technological innovation marked Japan’s rise to the status of a major power and the 
reliance on peaceful means of foreign policy, in particular such economic instruments of 
power as aid and foreign investment, has become the most important hallmark of 
Japan’s security policy once she recovered economically from the scar of war.28    
In this formation of the new norm of national security, the mass media played a 
significant role.  The mass media of post-war Japan enjoyed, for the first time, a total 
freedom of expression except during the brief period of GHQ rule in the 1940s.  The 
voice of the public easily reached the media, and it was loyal to the society by 
expressing the preference and the determination of the society to protect the newly 
formed social identity and the norm.  Without any “shock” that would entice the 
society to question the new norm at this period, the mass media was relatively free to 
speak out in diverse voices.  However, knowing the overall trend of the society in the 
post-war, the mass media strictly remained within the boundary of the norm and 
appealed to the public that it always stood with the public for the protection of the 
                                                  
28 Katzenstein, op.cit., p. 10. 
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supreme values the society upheld.  
 Although it is true that the unconditional trust the Japanese society held for the 
post-war identity and the security norm had remained constant until recently, there were 
in fact various incidents from 1950s to 1980s that caused the society to “feel stress” 
about the capability of the post-war norm in dealing with some security issues.  The 
existence of the Cold War was constantly giving stress to the society and made it to 
question whether the norm was indeed sufficient to guarantee Japan’s security.  The 
Korean War, the Oil Shock and the New Cold War in the 1980s backed up the anxiety 
held by some members of the society and the stress incremented throughout the Cold 
War years.  Japan had faced many external factors which could not be fully dealt with 
by the norm formed in the 1940s, and more members within the society saw the need 
for an adjustment of the norm to meet the new challenges.  These people, although 
without enthusiasm, understood why Japan needed a partial adjustment of its stance.  
Some factions in the government and the social elite group, in accordance to this 
reaction shown by the society, tried to win the justification for Japan’s more active 
posture in national security policies and the expansion of SDF, which had previously 
failed to realize in the 1940s and early 1950s.  For example, some cabinets, especially 
that of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in the 1950s, attempted to strengthen Japan’s 
military capability by advocating its necessity in the Cold War international system.  
Increasingly the government sought both to exploit and to mold the gradual change in a 
public opinion that came to accept grudgingly the existence of the SDF and the 
necessity of a modest national defense.29 
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But these stresses were not enough to dramatically alter the way the society 
valued the norm.  Although the society and most mass media agreed on the need for an 
adjustment, they did not see the reason to change the norm in a fundamental fashion, 
since there was no “shock” that shook the mentality of the society and they did not feel 
victimized by neither the external changes taking place in the international society nor 
the basic capability of the Japanese norm in dealing with these changes.  Thus, when 
the society felt that some factions in the government and the social elite group were 
going too far in interpretating the social acceptance, public was always quick to move in 
and make its voice to force the government to stay on course and control the excessive 
deviation from the basic principles of the national security norm.  Representing the 
social preference, mass media reserved the vehement criticism for any attempt to 
enhance Japan’s military capability and to develop a more active defense policy.30  
Any such attempt met with popular demonstration and Diet opposition, which were 
unanimously supported by the media.   
Whenever the need arose to control the government, the opposition in the mass 
media and the public relied on strategy of litigation so as to contest the normative 
context in which Japan’s national security was formulated, to counter the government’s 
policy.31  In other words, the Japanese society came to understand during the 1960s to 
1980s that the world was not perfect enough to allow Japan’s post-war ideal to be 
realized in its purest form and Japan would therefore require some realistic means of 
self-protection.  But rather than criticizing the norm, the society interpreted the dangers 
present in the international system as the consequence of the security dilemma existing 
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in the international system caused by the competition among the “egoistic” superpowers 
with selfish motivations to exert their powers.  So, for its own survival in this 
not-so-perfect world, Japan would need some “patching” on the national security norm 
formed in the post-war, such as the minor expansion of the military expenditures and the 
strengthening of the US-Japan Alliance, but it would maintain its norm upholding peace 
and commercialism on its top agenda.  Society and the media would strictly control 
any extreme measure by the radical groups in the social elites or the government who 
could abuse the stress brought in to the society by the international system.  For 
example, in the 1980s, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone emphasized overcoming the 
“negative self-identity” that flowed from the lost war and the victor’s justice.  He 
attempted to create a new collective identity, justifying pre-World War II history in 
some aspects, which would emphasize Japan’s positive role in world history in light of 
its accelerating internationalization and world-wide prestige.  In his words, “we 
Japanese must know about Japan itself.  In other words, this (knowing one-self) is 
often called identity, and this is an identity argument.”  But Nakasone’s attempts to 
overcome what he regarded as some debilitating consequences of wartime memory 
remained, at best, incomplete and controversial.32 
As the result, general effects of international factors on norm have been 
relatively small in the last two decades.  The overwhelming majority of Japanese have 
been skeptical about any dramatic departure from the status quo throughout the 1980s.33  
Until recently, the public has favored economic strength, peaceful democracy, and a 
low-key consensus approach; it overwhelmingly supports Article 9 of the Constitution.  
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The military has been viewed as marginal, and the public showed a marked lack of 
willingness to resort to armed defense even it Japan were to be attacked.34 
Without the shock brought by the North Korean Kidnapping Incident waiting to 
hit Japan until 2002, little changed even after the Cold War was brought to end and the 
international community faced drastic changes in the security order in East Asia and 
other parts of the world.  During the Gulf War in 1991, Japan supported the operations 
of the coalition forces financially without dispatching any ground troops, inviting 
criticism from abroad that Japan is not contributing sufficiently comparable to its 
international status.  Although some of the social elite groups and factions in the Diet 
and the government were very annoyed by this accusation and argued for more direct 
involvement, the society nevertheless strongly opposed any attempt that would use the 
criticism from the United States as a chance to alter the security norm.  Japanese public 
opinion, despite negative views of Saddam Hussein, showed overwhelming opposition 
to direct involvement in the war.35  Only 10% of the Japanese surveyed supported SDF 
dispatch with no limitations in the war.36  71% supported, and 20% were against, 
limiting Japan’s “international contribution” to the area of nonmilitary affairs.37   
 
2) Visible Signs of the Dawn of Possible Norm Transitional Period 
 
 Ever since the?North Korean kidnapping of Japanese citizens was made 
officially public by the Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, many of the hard-line social elites 
and some of the mass media group, including the journalism and all the television 
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networks, sensed the potential implication the issue could have on the minds of the 
Japanese public and has extensively covered the topic.  From early November, 2002, 
these media, aided by the academic guidance provided by the social elite?as the chief 
source of the background information, increasingly turned their coverage in the 
direction of sensationalism.??Academia, journalists, politicians, and so-called political 
commentators (hyoronka), who enjoy significant prestige on national television despite 
their ambiguous title and their wide-range?of “professional” field not necessarily related 
to the issue they comment on, provided the comfort to the public by legitimizing their 
anger.  Although much of the information they provided to the public was neither 
correct?nor proven, the extensive social trust the media enjoy in Japan and their role as 
the major information-provider for the public made all the comments to be accepted as 
the truth.  Since these certain media groups were widely supported by the public for 
sensitively reflecting the shocked-mood of the society and providing a simple and clear 
explanation for why they should feel so, other relatively late-comers in the mass media 
also joined the momentum.  As the result, limited to the abduction issue, all the mass 
media eventually started to show the same?tone. ?And the public, who were indeed 
shocked by the abduction issue in the beginning, but without any extensive knowledge 
or background information about the incident or their own detailed proposals for 
settling the issue, also came to share the identical ideas embedded into them by the 
homogeneous character of the media.  As their criticism turned toward the norm of the 
post-war Japan, the government was forced to conceal some of the agreements reached 
in Pyongyang for settling the abduction issue, such as the starting point for the 
economic aid package.  Koizumi cabinet had to even parry accusations of the public 
that he had accepted presents from Kim Jong-Il, several boxes of mushrooms.  The 
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public would not let an act of insensitivity ignoring the attitude of the people on the part 
of the government go unchecked.  Among numerous factors that need to be analyzed 
to see what can be revealed from the media sources since 2002, the articles showing the 
social-level and the governmental-level changes caused by the North Korean issue are 
provided here.  On the social-level change, three characteristics are pointed out: 1) The 
self-restriction of the media to parry criticism and the identical tone and the contents of 
the coverage, 2) The dominance of the sensationalism, and the verbal attacks on certain 
individuals gaining increasing support among the social members, especially among the 
younger generation, and 3) The re-interpretation of the modern history of Japan 
concerning her relations with the neighboring countries and the United States.  On the 
governmental-level change, the public statements of the politicians and 
politically-influential social elites concerning the argument for conducting more 
aggressive diplomatic posture, the nuclear-armament?issue, and the Amendment of the 
Constitution will be elaborated. 
 
A) Social-level Change 
 
The first characteristic?visible in the mass media that reflects the social-level 
change is its own restriction and censoring of the contents related to the abduction issue.  
Since it is clear that the social members prefer to hear a certain message they want, the 
mass media, some by their own conviction and some by the strategy to take a “safer 
path,” broadcast everything related to North Korea in a unanimously critical tone.  
Most of the news coverage transfers only a certain message officially announced by the 
Organization for the Victim’s Families, and all other sources, if they in any way conflict 
with the view of the victim’s families or the general public, are targeted for a severe 
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criticism.  For the post-war Japanese media which has been renowned for its liberal 
views and the diversity of opinions, this is a very significant sign.   
Some mass media experts point out that the most serious problem of the media 
coverage about North Korea since 2002 is that it does not allow any room for a different 
opinion.  The editorial manager of Weekly Friday says that the mass media since 
September 2002 is in a “very dangerous” state.  All the media corporations heavily 
depend on a particular source for information and the political interpretation, and other 
media which do not agree with that particular source are not allowed to voice their 
objection and are forced to maintain the self-restriction.  Limited to the abduction issue, 
the whole Japanese mass media seems to be in one large “club of correspondents (Kisha 
Kurabu).”38  Tokyo University Professor Emeritus Shozo Kimura, the chairman of the 
‘Committee for the Improvement of TV Programs (Hoso Bangumi Kojo Iinkai)’ jointly 
established by NHK (Nihon Hoso Kyokai, Japan’s National TV station) and other 
commercial broadcasting corporations, expresses his share of concern.  He says that 
the current programs related to the abduction transmit only “one-voice.”  That voice is 
not necessarily objective, and all the TV coverages concerning the incident are 
emotionally swayed by the angry feeling of “inexcusable North Korea.”  As a result, 
no first-person account of the victims ever goes public, while the voices of the victim’s 
families and their supporting organizations with various political agenda fill the 
channels.  All the news coverage is produced with the grand premise of “inexcusable 
North Korea” and it is a serious concern that the society rejects any other idea from 
being transmitted.39 
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The social elite group of academia and politicians who see the value in this 
movement actively support it.  Shinzo Abe, grandson of the former Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi and the current Deputy Cabinet Secretary, and who is also considered 
by many Japanese as the most likely candidate for the future Prime Minstership in 
various national polls, claims that anyone who argues that the critical national attitude 
against North Korea is taking a too emotional turn, is nothing else but “taking side” 
with the North Koreans.40  Opinion of such well-known social elites gives further 
justification to the society’s unanimously aggressive stance and is indirectly putting 
much pressure on some portions of the media which previously did not bandwagon with 
the “North Korea Bashing.”  Monthly Sekai, which has been a leading liberal voice 
concerning North Korea, is currently under an extreme criticism after 2002.  As the 
result of these attacks, Sekai was pressured to write an explanatory article, an act 
unprecedented in the post-war mass media history of Japan, about why it has taken such 
a stance in the past.  Sekai says that under the current social transformation where the 
individuals and the media that had taken an active part, with a good intention, to realize 
the reopening of the good relations between Japan and North Korea and to overcome the 
complicated historical legacies are being criticized as North Korea’s “agents,” it feels 
obliged to make it clear, once and for all, the basic political stance the corporation holds 
about North Korea:41 “Sekai was first published in 1945 with a determination not to 
repeat another tragedy between Japanese and her neighbors.  We have engaged 
ourselves in conversations about the historical issues with the people of Korean 
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Peninsula to facilitate the mutual understanding and reconciliation, and we have 
believed that the engagement with the neighbors and broadcasting the true aspect of 
them would be essential for both Japanese and Koreans.  The current state of Japan, we 
believe unfortunately, contains many ideas which support bashing and terrorizing 
against North Koreans in Japan and interrupting the reopening of the diplomatic relation 
with North Korea.  We believe that such stance is heavily influenced by the distorted 
image many Japanese still hold toward Korean Peninsula and that is exactly the reason 
why we have taken active part to cover North Korea with our historical conviction.  
The very fact that we have to explain and plead for our obvious and self-explanatory 
political stance in a column paradoxically shows the bizarre state of the current 
Japan.”42 
The second characteristic of the Japanese media after 2002 is the increased 
sensationalism in the media tones and the heightening of criticism on the post-war 
political institution and on certain individuals who have raised a different voice from the 
general public sentiment.  The sensationalism and the criticism are gaining increasing 
support among the social members, especially among the younger generation. 
 After the North Korean abduction incident was disclosed, many academics 
specializing in the national security field were asked by the media to write articles in 
extreme and radical tone, while papers with “moderate” ideas were turned down.43  
While the economic recession has forced many political magazines to cutback their 
circulation, Weekly Sapio, a political magazine subsidiary to Sankei newspaper with a 
nationalistic right-wing stance, recently has increased their circulation by 30,000 from 
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the original 150,000 copies.  The editor chief Ken Shiomi says that the main target for 
the paper is the young generation in the 20s and early 30s.  Monthly Seiron, also a part 
of Sankei, is equally enjoying wide support and is now selling more than 30,000 copies 
a day.44  A professor of political science at Waseda University points out that the 
frequency of his undergraduates quoting and relying on Sapio for research has 
drastically increased in the last few years, and among twenty students under his 
supervision, more than half are regular subscribers.  Recently, these student readers of 
Sapio submitted thesis with the claims that Japan should retaliate North Korean nuclear 
threat with Japan’s own nuclear arsenal, and Peace Constitution should not just be 
amended, but abrogated all together.45 
 Besides the sensational tones of the media and the widening support for them 
among the social members, open criticism against certain individuals who do not side 
with the tones of such media is widespread.  Although criticism on a group, such as the 
beaurocrats or the political parties, has been common, openly targeting certain 
individuals for their role in the Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang or their comments 
concerning the abduction issue is a development that deserves attention.  Since 
September 2002, Hitoshi Tanaka, the beaurocrat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who 
arranged the Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang to reopen the diplomatic channel, met with 
vicious accusations from the mass media, alleging him to be a North Korea’s agent.46  
Noted journalist Soichiro Tahara, when he once made a comparison on a national 
television, of thousands of Korean workers coerced to come to Japan during World War 
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II as forced labor with the case of North Korean kidnapping, suffered equal fate with a 
violent threat and criticism on his personal historical standpoint. 47   The most 
prominent of the critics, obviously, was the family members of the former abductees.48 
The last visible characteristic shown by the Japanese mass media after the 
North Korean shock is the deliberate act of relating the North Korean abduction issue 
with the “official” Japanese post-war historical standpoint, ardently looking for a way to 
produce a logical connection between the abduction incident and the justification to 
throw away the official historical interpretation dominated by Japan’s guilty feeling 
toward its neighbors.  Nakanishi Terumasa, a renowned scholar of Kyoto University 
who regularly writes to national political journals, claims that Japanese must learn a 
lesson from the North Korean incident.  He implies that Japanese are the real victims 
of the regional history, as is the case of the kidnapping, not the other way around as the 
Japanese are “forced” to accept as a fact.  Concerning the memories of World War II 
and its subsequent influence on the formation of the post-war relations with the 
neighbors, he says the “frame of reference” that Japanese has embraced in 
understanding itself and the international system, including their perspectives in 
viewing the relations between Japan and foreign countries, its own history, and the 
values and ideology underneath such views, is now at a critical junction to be 
re-evaluated.  Japanese should now question the mental principles of themselves and it 
should lead to the basic alternation of the current mental state of Japan.  To do that, 
Japanese has to first bid farewell to the twisted memories of the post-war history from 
his mentality, which has forced them to embrace a sense of guilt toward her neighbors 
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up to now.49 
 
B) Governmental-level Change 
 
 The changes taking place in the society and their impact on the mass media are 
recognized by the government and by the social elites with influential positions around 
the political decision-making system.  Renowned nationalistic statesman and Tokyo 
Governor Shintaro Ishihara points out that the North Korean abduction issue is the 
single most important factor that has invited Japanese public to lose the illusions of the 
post-war institution and finally, after half a century, to realize the proper mindset one 
should embrace for his nation and the people.  The incident made people angry and 
constructed the genuine sense of solidarity among the people.  Shinzo Abe agrees and 
expresses his own surprise to get such a strong and positive support from the society for 
asserting aggressive stance toward North Korea and openly blaming the erroneous 
post-war political institution.  Both share the common viewpoint that the opinions of 
the general public has indeed changed considerably.50  Under such circumstances, 
Professor of National Defense University (Boei Daigaku) Matake Kamiya, who 
possesses a significant amount of influence in the construction of the national security 
policy-making in the Japan Defense Agency, argues that the rejection Japanese society 
has shown until now toward any movement related to military should be finally 
overcome at this point of the post-war.51  He, like many of his contemporaries, openly 
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claim that Japanese public should now seriously consider the prospect of Japan 
rearming itself and abandoning the Constitution, since the people have now realized the 
naiveté of their country from the lesson given by North Koreans. 
 Generally, the Cabinet and the bureaucratic system of various Ministries, along 
with the faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that supports 
Koizumi, are taking a more cautious approach on any issue with a possible consequence 
on changing the current political institution.  With the burden of direct responsibility 
on their shoulders for any result that can arise from the alternation of the political 
system, these groups are carefully analyzing the effect of the social changes taking place 
in relations to Japan’s regional diplomacy.  However, other political groups not directly 
related to the decision-making process, but who nevertheless enjoy significant influence 
in guiding the direction of Japan’s national security - Young Turks within the LDP 
(Wakate Giin) supporting more nationalistic agenda, regional politicians, the academia 
with connections to the media, the bureaucratic establishment, and the Diet members of 
the National Security Committee, including the ones from the opposition Democratic 
Party of Japan - are without such burden and are more sensitive about the changes 
taking place in the society.  Many members of these groups currently advocate for the 
Amendment of the Constitution and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan for the new 
century.  And for them, utilizing the social momentum after the kidnapping incident is 
a crucial factor to push the government.  Therefore, many well-known figures within 
these groups openly admit that the shocked status of the society now supporting 
once-considered-extreme ideas compels them to believe that as far as the Constitution 
and the armament issues are concerned, it is either “now or never.”   
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 The most visible sign of the changes in the social norm can be seen when we 
analyze what actually motivates the political decision-makers and the pressure groups 
within the political circle to make a particular political decision.  And through this 
analysis, we can once again encounter the tremendous influence the public sentiment 
has on the decision-making process of the government.  Notwithstanding the 
Constitution and the armament issue, other related security agendas are also waiting to 
get more social support and be passed in the Diet in the aftermath of the momentum 
caused by the North Korean shock, such as the bills enabling the government to impose 
an economic sanction on a particular country or prohibiting vessels from certain 
countries from entering Japanese harbor, and the controversial proposal that the 
government and the SDF be able to control public and private properties more freely 
when the nation is considered to be in an emergency situation (National Emergency Bill, 
Yuji Kanren Hoan).  A Diet member of the opposition party (Liberal Party of Japan) 
Yukio Ubukata points out what really motivated the majority of the Diet members to 
support the National Emergency Bill.  In the first place, one-fourth of his party was 
against it, and another one-fourth supporting the bill.  The rest had not made up their 
minds.  However, when the newspapers wrote that “70% of the public support the 
bill,” all the undecided members turned to the supporting stance in a day.52  In January 
2004, Monthly Seiron conducted a survey of all 480 members of the Diet on their views 
about the North Korean Abduction Issue, economic sanction about North Korea, and the 
prohibition of North Korean passenger ships that connect the ethnic Koreans to their 
relatives in the North from entering Japan.  Not surprisingly, all of the members, 
except three from the Communist Party, supported the bills and declared the abduction 
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as an act of terrorism.  The answers were obvious, but more interesting aspect of the 
survey was revealed when they were asked for the reason for their opinion: Most replied 
that “because such stance is gaining increasing support among the public.”53 
 Concerning the most publicized Constitutional Amendment Issue, when 48 
young new members of the Diet, all of them in their 30s, were asked whether they 
support the amendment with abolition of the Article 9, 27 answered “yes” and three not 
disclosing their stance.54  For many advocates of the amendment in the Diet and other 
political realm, the most convincing justification for their argument is, again, about the 
legitimacy of the Constitution and the post-war norm which sustained the supreme law 
until now.  Shinzo Abe argues that as the by-product of the war, Japanese people have 
been immersed in this peculiar sense of rejection against anything related to the 
governmental authority which can limit the freedom of individuals.  However, the 
abduction incident provided to the people a clear example that the ideals stated in the 
Peace Constitution, that “Japanese trust the justness and the righteousness of the people 
around the world,” is indeed naïve and that good intention cannot protect the people.  
For the first time, people have realized that the nation and the governmental authority is 
the only shield for the self-preservation.55  Shintaro Ishihara supports the current social 
and political move toward the Amendment by discrediting the origin and the legitimacy 
of the Constitution, claiming that the Constitution was “written by Americans in the 
GHQ with no professional background in law” and thus deserves not just the 
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amendment, but total abrogation.56  Kenzo Yoneda, former Cabinet Deputy Minister of 
the Koizumi administration and currently professor of Teikyo University, gives a similar 
view, saying that it is just to reconsider the appropriateness of the Constitution, for it 
was enacted by the pressure of the American occupation forces.57 
 Among certain factions within the political circle, such voices had already 
existed in the past, but never enjoyed such a wide support.  The clear transformation of 
the “mood” in Japan is apparent when we compare the current trend with that of the 80s, 
when nationalism was also prevalent, although without the shock element as we can see 
after 2002.  Former Prime Minister during the 1980s, Yasuhiro Nakasone admits that 
while his cabinet worked to put Constitution Amendment in the Diet Agenda, it was not 
even allowed to be put on a schedule for a formal evaluation at the time, chiefly because 
of the strong opposition in the domestic opinion and the fear of bringing unnecessary 
consequences in the international relations.  However, indirectly indicating the 
influence the abduction has had on the public mind, he admits that now the right time 
has come.58  Many supporters of the Amendment, after 2002, are stepping out to give 
even a detailed process of how the Amendment should be enacted.  One of the 
arguments proposes that the first step should annul the current Constitution, followed by 
the enactment of the provisional Constitution without the Article 9.  The second step is 
the construction of a new Constitution, based on the method and the ideals of the 
pre-war Meiji Constitution.  According to this logic, the reason for taking such step is 
clear: Since the U.S. “kidnapped” the legitimate Japanese Constitution and forced upon 
the Japanese people, with the help of the “political minority” within the society, a new 
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law not reflecting the true will of Japan.  In a sense, the victims kidnapped by North 
Koreans were the victims of the Peace Constitution; the Constitution, and especially the 
Article 9, is the real cause behind this tragedy.  At this point, Japan should annul both 
the Constitution and the fabricated history of pre-war Japan forced upon the Japanese by 
the U.S. and the nations of East Asia.59 
 The issue of Japan’s nuclear armament, currently debated parallel to the 
Constitution agenda, is also perceived by the political circle and the public very 
differently than in the past.  Along with the Constitution Amendment “taboo,” any 
claim in support of Japan’s nuclear armament has been the most certain way to lose 
office.  In 1999, Shingo Nishimura, currently a Diet member of the Liberal Party and 
who held office at the time as the Vice-Minister of National Defense (Boei Seimu Jikan), 
was swiftly forced to resign after mentioning about the possibility of Japan’s nuclear 
armament.  In the past, it was easy to predict the criticism one would get from 
mentioning anything about nuclear.  For the politicians, sensitive to the impact of their 
statements in the elections, armament issue was something that should not be touched 
publicly.  However, the North Korean issue, not necessarily limited to the abduction 
but her nuclear program as well, helped such “taboo” to vanish.  For many young Diet 
members who do not share the prudence of the earlier generation, nuclear issue, just like 
the Constitution, is a political agenda that should purely reflect the will of the public.60  
When 48 Diet members in their 30s were asked about their opinion on the nuclear 
armament, nine openly supported the stance.61  Although not a majority, comparing to 
the political handling of the issue only a few years ago, the change taking place in the 
                                                  
59 Tsunemi Koyama, ‘Now is the time to annul the Constitution (Ima-koso Nihon-koku Kempo-wo 
Muko-to seyo),’ Monthly Seiron, (Sankei Shimbunsha, April Edition, 2004), pp. 71-75. 
60 Okamoto, Uchiyama & Kuzutani, ‘Neo-Conservatizing Japan,’ op. cit., p. 11. 
61 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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Diet looks striking. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion and Implications 
 
Foreign policy decision-making of a nation is greatly influenced by that nation’s 
political norm.  The transformation of the political norm is not necessarily reflective of 
the changes taking place outside the nation’s boundary.  In order to change the political 
norm of a nation, not an international pressure, but an internal shock, which has a 
tremendous impact on changing how the society perceives its own political identity, has 
to function.  When that shock is reinforced by other social stress that have 
incrementally permeated within the society, then these stress give further justification 
for the people to feel “normal” about being shocked and raising their voice against the 
norm, and the opportunity for a norm change sets in. 
Shock provides the people an opportunity to feel that maintaining the political 
norm makes them the victim of their own political institution.  When the shock clearly 
puts pressure on a significant number of social members, social elite class of scholars 
and politicians, along with their supporting mass media factions, uses the opportunity to 
spark the discontent of the people against the prevailing norm by providing the evidence 
of the norm’s impotence, mostly from the previous cases of social stress that had been 
caused by the limitations of the norm but previously oppressed by the strong prevalence 
of the norm in the society at that time.  When the majority expresses their discontent of 
the norm with the help of the social elite group, and if this movement takes momentum 
and spread widely within the society, then the transitional period of the norm 
 55
transformation is about to begin. 
When this argument is applied to current Japan after 2002, we can see that the 
Japanese public, for the first time in the post-war period, has genuinely felt anger and 
shock at the news of the North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens.  This shock has 
turned to the anger and frustration toward the post-war political norm of Japan, which 
includes the Peace Constitution and Japan’s own historical interpretation dominated by 
guilt, as society came to interpret that the norm has been the main cause of inviting the 
incident.  The social elites and the supporting mass media provided the justification for 
this clear interpretation by giving more past examples of the impotence and the naiveté 
of the norm.  This clear distrust of the post-war norm is shared by many, but 
significantly more so among the younger generation who do not necessarily share the 
historical legacy of the past generation.  When this interpretation flowed in the society 
and when the cry for the transformation of the norm came out to the open, other mass 
media, sensitive to the majority opinion, or the “general atmosphere (taisei)” of the 
society, started to bandwagon, thus further facilitating the movement heading toward the 
transitional period.   
 Although this trend is understandable when we examine the brutality of the 
North Korean act, the current movement taking place in Japan can possibly bring other 
implications in the future, not necessarily positive, in the Japanese politics and her 
relation with her neighbors.  The consequence of the current social movement, if 
transitional period actually brings a new norm dominated by the sense of 
self-victimization elaborated in this paper, will be visible in two areas, first in the 
domestic Japanese politics and secondly, in her relation with the neighboring countries 
and the U.S., possibly causing some significant changes in the regional security 
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framework. 
 In the area of domestic politics, the most visible sign will be the amendment of 
the Constitution.  In Japan, the amendment chiefly means the future prospect of the 
Article 9.  If, as the consequence of the current norm-transition, the Japanese public 
actually moves toward the amendment, the process will inevitably bring a new 
interpretation of the historical background which brought the current Constitution in the 
first place.  The advocates of the amendment will argue against the legitimacy of the 
Constitution and claim the role the United States played in the design of the post-war 
institution of Japan.  Under the current social atmosphere, it will likely bring the 
negative re-interpretation of the role of the U.S. in forming the Constitution and it will 
be used as the main reason for arguing against the legitimacy.  Also, since the 
Constitution was built under the basic assumption of the Japan’s act during the pre-war 
period toward other nations, the amendment and the parallel debate about the historical 
assumption beneath the Constitution will bring forth new claims about how Japan 
should overcome the negative image it has had toward itself.  In short, the change of 
norm will likely to bring the amendment argument stronger than in the past, and in the 
case of the actual realization of the amendment, this will have a significant impact on 
how Japan views the U.S., Korean Peninsula, and China differently from under the 
post-war norm.  Historical re-interpretation about the Constitution and the regional 
history prior to the defeat in World War II will cause Japan to withdraw herself from the 
same historical interpretation that the public in general has held in the past and shared 
with the related nations, and this discrepancy in the “official” historical standpoint 
between Japan and her neighbors will likely to cause the Japanese public to support 
taking stronger measures toward outside, if the public’s sense of self-victimization 
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toward the post-war norm prevails during the norm-changing process and during the 
amendment of the Constitution.  Many nationalistic academia calling for the change in 
Japan’s post-war political framework claim that Japan, after the kidnapping incident has 
been disclosed, should now make active measures to bury the erroneous historical 
interpretation that forces the Japanese to feel remorse continually for its past.  The 
historical legacy, they claim, is already a settled problem and that is the “international 
common sense.”62  These social elites argue that Japanese public should realize it and 
move on to embrace a new historical perspective which will produce a productive new 
norm for Japan. 
 Secondly, in the area of Japan’s relations with the neighboring countries and its 
implication for the regional security framework, we can predict that the changes in 
Japan will cause a genuine concern in China and the two regimes in the Korean 
Peninsula, and possibly in the U.S. in the long-run.  For Korea and China, Japan’s 
embracement of a new formal historical interpretation means Japan declaring at least a 
partial justification for its act in the past.  This will inevitably cause, at the government 
and social level, the common ground of viewing the regional history to collapse.  For 
the three neighboring regimes that share the sense of historical victimhood by Japan, 
this development, where Japan actually feels victimized by the post-war historical 
perception she commonly shared with the three regimes up to now, can possibly cause 
these nations to take a cautionary approach toward Japan.  Since the neighboring 
countries are experiencing their own rise of nationalism, this development can bring a 
negative spiral effect and cause further negative implications in the regional politics.  
Although Japan’s relation with the U.S. is unlikely to change in any fundamental way in 
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the near future, especially in the governmental and bureaucratic level, the changes in the 
norm symbolized by the possible amendment of the Constitution and the way the public 
justifies the reason for such amendment can also alter the way the Japanese society, 
especially in the academia, views the nature of the bilateral relation with the U.S. and 
further advocate the need for more “equal term” with the U.S. in the long-run.  The 
pressure the government has taken from the society to take more “imposing” and 
“stately” manner when dealing with the U.S. is not new.  The 1980s saw one of the 
peaks in that trend, but the government had always been able to take more objective 
steps and is expected to follow equally strategic and calm approach in the future.  
However, if the similar trend in the society reinforced by the changes in the norm 
revisits in the future, the upward pressure from the grass roots is expected to be much 
stronger and the government will have to reflect one way or another to the changing 
attitude of the public toward the relations with the U.S. 
 This paper has pointed out that the contemporary constructivist and historical 
institutionalist approaches to national security policies have concentrated only on 
analyzing the formation of a certain political norm in a society and the origin of the 
norm from a historical perspective.  And they have shown less-than-satisfactory effort 
to analyze how a certain norm transforms into a new one, although they have agreed 
that norm is not a perpetual aspect of a nation.  Concerning Japan, many 
constructivists have elaborated the nature and the content of the peaceful characteristic 
of the post-war political norm and have invested considerable amount of effort to 
analyze the historical origin.  Therefore, they claim that as long as the post-war 
security arrangements, such as the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Constitution, remain 
intact, the prospect of Japan transforming into another nation with a new norm is highly 
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unlikely.  As long as the U.S. extends a security guarantee over Japan, there will be no 
pressure or incentives to push the Japanese government to change security policy.63  
Although the paper follows the basic assumptions of constructivist approach, it has also 
deviated from the contemporary constructivism by concentrating on the transitional 
period where a norm changes into a new form.  And in that sense, the paper does not 
fully share the general claims of the constructivist approach about the post-war Japan.  
The paper has shown with the case of Japan after the Koizumi visit to Pyongyang in 
2002 that even if the basic security arrangement is unaltered, the public’s view toward 
its own norm can still have a significant impact on the status of that norm within the 
society.  The abduction issue generated, for the first time in the post-war Japanese 
society, a unanimous and genuine feeling of shock and sense of self-victimization by an 
act of a nation Japan has traditionally felt the sense of guilt.  If the current trend 
continues and the public feels the norm to be obsolete and causes further discontent, the 
norm, along with the security policies, will be targeted for a re-evaluation.  Therefore, 
although Japanese norm has been intact for over fifty years and the basic security 
institution is unlikely to change in the near future, the society’s perspective of the 
general origin and the role of the norm, not necessarily limited to the U.S.-Japan 
relations but extending to other general issues such as the Constitution and historical 
interpretation of the past, are what matters when we analyze the nation’s future prospect 
of the norm and the likeliness of policy changes. 
 After Koizumi’s revisit to Pyongyang in 2004 to bring Ms. Hitomi Soga and 
other former abductees’ family members to Japan, the tone in the Japanese society has 
quiet down to a certain degree and the occasion of the incident being displayed on the 
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news headlines has decreased.  However, there are still numerous social elite groups 
and the mass media working hard to remind the public about the incident and the issue 
of the post-war norm in relation to the incident.  And although there can be changes in 
the intensity, the abduction issue is still a primary agenda in the Japanese society and to 
the government sensitive to the voices of the public.  It is likely that the intensity of the 
abduction issue in dominating the minds of the public will gradually subside, but it 
should be noted that the way Japanese public views the post-war political norm of 
national security has once and for all fundamentally changed after the period of 
2002-2004.  Although not necessarily all the members in the society share the same 
discontent against the norm, the period of 2002-2004 has provided the public a stage to 
talk about the taboo and the sacred tradition of the post-war period in a more open 
fashion.  The arguments against the norm, previously discarded by the society as an 
extreme minority opinion, are currently enjoying more coverage and publication with 
increasing support especially among the younger generation.  These ideas can be 
mainly sustained by the social consequence of the abduction shock.  Therefore, the 
incident, in a way, has opened a door leading to a new historical stage and led Japan to a 
new step in the debate of the post-war norm.  The frequency of the coverage in the 
society in general might diminish as other issues arise, but the fact that the kidnapped 
Japanese issue has facilitated the society to overcome the post-war taboo, raising voices 
to question the incompetence of the political norm, is clear.  Therefore, the implication 
of the Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang and the shock the abduction incident has brought 
deserves more attention for further analysis to anyone researching the political culture 
and the norm of Japan. 
